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1. Introduction 
 
Assessing climate change related challenges is at the core of the current European environmental 
policy agenda. 
On the one hand, the Europe 2020 strategy (EC 2010a, 2010b) set the following goals for European 
Countries: i) to achieve a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as compared to 1990 
levels; a 20% reduction in the share of renewable energy sources used in final energy consumption; 
iii) a 20% reduction of final energy consumption compared to business as usual scenario to be 
achieved through improved energy efficiency.  
On the other hand, with the launch of the policy framework for climate and energy for 2030 it has 
become even clearer that Member States are expected to further improve their efforts towards a 
low-carbon economy. ETS
1
 and non-ETS sectors are indeed subject to the new target of reducing 
greenhouse gases emissions (GHG) of 40% with respect to 1990 by 2030 (EC, 2014).   
The actual achievement of these targets depends not only on the selection process of the available 
policy instruments (which will be discussed in Section 3) but also on the effects that policies may 
have on competitiveness, either at a micro, meso or macro perspective. 
Since the formulation of the Porter Hypothesis (PH) (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995), much 
emphasis has been given to the potential competitive and productive gains (rather than losses) that 
might be deriving from the adoption of stricter environmental regulation. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) 
propose to identify three different versions of this hypothesis. The ‗weak‘ version postulates that 
environmental regulations stimulate innovation productivity. The ‗strong‘ version argues that 
regulation-driven ―innovation offsets‖ might exceed the costs of compliance, which might result in 
net productivity gains. Lastly the ‗narrow‘ version posits that well-designed regulations give firms 
greater incentives to innovate and thus will have less adverse impact on productivity.  
Understanding how environmental policies can avoid harming growth, either in strong, weak or 
narrow terms, is indeed a crucial issue in designing policies.  
Strong empirical research effort has been devoted to the analysis of the effects of environmental 
policies both on innovative activities (mainly weak version of PH) and on competitiveness (narrow 
or strong version of PH).  
With respect to the first group, the literature mainly recognizes that regulation strongly induces 
technological change (Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Costantini & Mazzanti, 2012; Horbach  et 
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 ETS stands for European Trading System, working on a ‗cap and trade‘ principle. For more information on this policy 
scheme the reader can look at the European Union website http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. 
al.2012; Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; Johnstone et al. 2010a; 2010b; 2012; Lanjouw & Mody, 1996; 
Rennings & Rexhäuser, 2011; Ghisetti and Quatraro, 2013). These empirical evidences in other 
terms support the hypothesis that properly designed policies foster firms‘ decisions to improve their 
products or production processes introducing environmental innovations.  
With respect to the second group, the effects of environmental policies on productivity might be 
more complex than policies on innovation, as regulation may improve productivity in some specific 
activities in the short run but at the same time might engender counter indirect effects.  
Berman and Bui (2001) found that air pollution regulation in the oil refining industry determined 
significant productivity gains. On the contrary, Gray and Shadbegian (1998) in analyzing the pulp 
and paper industry found that pollution abatement investments ―crowded out‖ more productive 
investment, while Greenstone (2001) found a negative productivity impact engendered by air 
pollution regulation.  
In principle, at the aggregate level it might be that regulation eliminates less efficient firms thus 
raising productivity but it might also be that it acts as an entry cost that, in reducing competition, 
lowers productivity levels. All in all ―empirical research on the productivity effects of 
environmental policies is largely inconclusive. Results are usually very context-specific and hence 
of little use for policy makers deciding on which tools to choose to tackle a particular environmental 
issue‖ (Kozluk and Zipperer, 2013:21).  Overall ―a priori, it is however unclear whether these 
indirect effects are negative or positive, or whether they are large enough to outweigh the drag of 
the direct effect‖ (Kozluk and Zipperer, 2013:9). Although early studies have found a negative link 
between regulation and productivity (Palmer et al., 1995), Ambec et al. (2013) in a more recent 
review explain the conflicting previous results in terms of a set of factors such as the environmental 
problem addressed by regulation, the sector and market conditions, the methodology followed and 
firms specificities in terms of management.  
In parallel, a further aspect that deserves consideration when discussing about environmental 
policies is their possible side effect on non-regulated systems. The increase in environmental 
policies stringency can indeed generate ―pollution havens‖. According to the pollution haven 
hypothesis, differences in policy stringency among countries can encourage those exposed to less 
stringent regulation to gain competitive advantages in the production and export of ―dirty‖ products. 
On the contrary, those facing stricter regulations will be tempted to relocate in other countries their 
production, in order to escape regulation. As a result, the offshoring of polluting production 
processes in countries with less stringent regulation may even result in greater global pollution, as 
environmental efficiency (i.e. pollution per unit of output) in these countries is expected to be 
systematically worse than that observed in more regulated countries. 
Although evidence on this hypothesis is still inconclusive (Brunnermeier & Levinson, 2004; Cave 
& Blomquist, 2008), as Cave and Blomquists‘s (2008) empirical analysis points out, there is 
evidence of a greater amount of imported energy-intensive goods by EU countries from other 
countries with weaker regulation in correspondence of increasing stringency of EU environmental 
policies. 
The objective of this paper is to discuss the different policy instruments that can be relevant in 
shaping innovation in environmental friendly technologies by providing a taxonomy of different 
classes of instruments both in the environmental and innovation domains. The joint analysis of 
these two sets of policies appears to be relevant as previous literature has showed that contrasting 
effects between environmental goals and competitiveness can be mitigated when environmental 
policies are positively integrated with innovation and technology policies. When this happens the 
inducement effects of environmental policies on the generation of green innovations can be greater 
as adequate technological capabilities are available and it is easier to catch new market and 
technological opportunities (Costantini and Crespi, 2008; Horbach et al., 2012). An econometric 
test on the relevance of the reviewed policies in shaping different types of eco-innovations is 
provided in Appendix.      
The reminder of the paper is organized as it follows. Section 2 presents a description of 
environmental policies by type of policy instruments. Section 3 discusses the intertwining between 
innovation and environmental policies while 4 provides a synthesis and elaborate a framework to 
integrated innovation-oriented environmental policy. 
2 Environmental policies 
 
Environmental policies are built through the adoption of one or possibly a combination of a set of 
policy instruments. According to their nature, those might be classified as it follows (OECD, 2010): 
1. Market / Incentive-based instruments 
2. Command and Control regulation instruments 
3. Voluntary (also called negotiated) agreements  
4. Information / Education-based instruments 
 
The market-based and command and control regulatory instruments ―may be thought of as ‗hard‘ 
instruments, because they impose explicit obligations, whereas voluntary and information-based 
instruments may be thought of as ‗soft‘ instruments, because they rely more on or seek to stimulate 
discretionary activities ‖ (Ekins, 2010: 282). 
This section discusses these groups of policy instruments, combining the description of the 
instruments with some examples of effective policies at stake and their strengths and weaknesses in 
order to provide (into Section 4) some prescriptions on how to choose among them.  
Market or Incentive Based Instruments 
The first set of existing instruments aims at indirectly reducing environmental pressure by 
introducing market incentives that correct for externalities and balance the private with the social 
prices. Such instruments span from emissions trading, environmental taxes and charges, deposit-
refund systems, subsidies and compensation mechanisms and green purchasing (EEA, 2005).  
These instruments may encourage firms towards pollution control, as it becomes their own interest 
and allow to collectively meeting policy goals (Stavins, 2003). 
Emission trading schemes may mainly consist in cap-and-trade or credit systems. Cap-and-trade 
systems impose an upper threshold for selected pollutants (cap) and then the permits to pollute are 
allocated and traded (trade) in order to reach a cost-effective way to reduce emissions. The 
European Trading Scheme (EU ETS), established under the Directive 2003/87/EC, is a concrete 
example of cap-and-trade system and the largest available in the world, which has been set as the 
cornerstone of EU‘s strategy for addressing climate change. EU ETS, launched on January 2005, set 
a legally binding cap on CO2 emissions and equivalents (nitrous oxide N2O) and per-fluorocarbons 
(PFCs) that covers power and heat generating plants, energy intensive industry sectors (including 
refineries, steel works and production of iron, aluminum, metals, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, 
pulp, paper, cardboard, acids and bulk organic chemicals) and aviation. The European cap was 
concretely translated into country caps (National allocation plans) and a market of allowances has 
been built, that gives those who hold the permit the right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) or 
equivalent gases per permit. The sectoral distribution of national caps has been established in a 
decentralized way at each country level.  
In a first phase (2005-2007), the testing phase, allowances were distributed free of charge following 
the principle of historical emissions (grandfathering), or of benchmarking based on projected 
emissions for new entrants. The choice of allocation free of charge was to reduce resistance from 
industry by offsetting part of the adjustment costs (Zetterberg, 2014). However, this ex ante free 
allocation has the drawback of reducing the consensus around the policy if this is perceived as 
unfair because it gives dirty emitters more allowances than to firms who already moved to cleaner 
production techniques. A penalty for non-compliance to the cap was set as well as national registers 
to monitor allowances. In a second phase (2008- 2012) allowances were still distributed for free, but 
the penalty has been increased and the amount of emissions covered by the cap was reduced by 
6.5%. The last phase substituted free allowances with an auctioning process and moved the 
allocation from national governments to the central authority. For sectors that are not covered by the 
EU ETS, each member state has to individually design measure that lead to a 10% reduction in 
emission by 2020, compared to 2005 levels. Although the EU ETS has been seen as possible bench 
for a global cap and trade system, its application presented a lot of problems spanning from the 
over-allocation of allowances in the first phase and transparency problems (e.g. Vlachou, 2014) to 
the apparently neutral effects of EU ETS on innovative activities (Borghesi et al. 2012; Calel & 
Dechezleprêtre, 2014). EU ETS effects on CO2 reduction are instead less controversial, as previous 
empirical literature outlined its positive environmental effects (Martin et al. 2014a; 2014b). EC 
proposed indeed a strong revision of the Scheme for its third phase 2013-2020 (EC 2008).  
Credit systems set a minimum level on the emission performance instead of imposing a quota on 
emissions, and participants receive credits from the emission reductions they achieved with respect 
to the selected baseline. An example of this system is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
of the Kyoto Protocol aimed at favoring technology transfer that gives industrialized countries to 
develop or finance projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions in other countries to obtain 
emission reduction credits. Furthermore, CDM gives technical and financial support for the 
diffusion of green technology towards countries who have not accepted the emission reduction 
targets (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008). 
Environmental taxes and charges are ways to internalize in the producers those external costs that 
are spread over the society in terms of environmental damage, for instance by imposing a tax on 
pollutant activities. A Carbon tax is probably the most common type of environmental tax. 
Regulation sets a price for CO2 (or CO2 equivalent) emissions which the polluters are required to 
pay for its emissions.  
Alternatively the tax can be set on inputs of the production process, for instance on fuels, water 
usage or pesticides or on outputs, for instance on air tickets. De Serres et al (2010) provide a 
synthesis of the existing taxes or charges by environmental domains for separately considered 
OECD countries. 
Not only CO2 emissions can be taxed, but other emissions as well: SO2 and NOx are under an 
emission tax in several countries e.g. Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, France, Slovenia, 
although with a quite high variation of tax rates (Requate, 2005). 
A recent EEA study (EEA, 2014) shows that the debate on environmental taxes has not lead to a 
widespread application of such an instrument. During 1995–2012, EU-27 environmental taxes as a 
percentage of GDP fell indeed from 2.8 % in 1999 to 2.3 % in 2008, while environmental taxes as a 
percentage of total tax revenues from 6.9 % to 5.9 % (EEA, 2014). Those taxes are mainly 
depending on energy taxes, which contribute to the largest share.  
Morley (2012) empirically tested at EU wide scale the effectiveness of environmental taxation on 
both pollution and energy consumption. His findings are of an effective negative effect of 
regulation on pollution, which decreases because of the introduction of environmental taxes, while 
limited effect is found for the use of resources, in particular energy consumption. This lead the 
author to conclude that the overall impact depends also on the structure of other tax levels. 
The potential positive side effect of environmental taxes deserves consideration for their positive 
role for fiscal consolidation, which makes them less detrimental than other taxes for growth (EC, 
2012; 2013). Even leaving aside the concerns about the negative effects of environmental taxation 
on competitiveness, carbon pricing schemes did not prove to engender any statistical significant 
impact on electricity retail prices (EC, 2014). Moreover, revenues from the tax can be reinvested by 
the government in eco-innovation, increasing both patenting and thus technology efficiency 
employment (EEA, 2011) and increased efficiency of technology. In a study by De Vries and 
Medhi (2008) it has been found that an increase in fuel prices by 0.1 US$ per liter created 14 % 
increase in patenting activity. 
However, for environmental taxes or cap-and-trade systems to be effective, the harmonization of 
environmental policies across countries is required. In the absence of such a harmonization, there 
exist a concrete risk of relocation of production toward countries having adopted less strict 
regulation, also known as ―carbon leakage‖. The industrial relocation not only would weaken the 
environmental effectiveness of a policy, but would also result in deep costs for the society in terms 
of job losses. As a consequence to that, energy-intensive firms usually find grants or exemptions in 
the presence of a carbon tax, even though this does not make the polluter-pays principle effective 
(Martin et al., 2014). 
Instead of adding a tax on pollution, the policy maker can alternatively subsidize environmental-
friendly activities, to directly encourage the reduction of negative externalities. The subsidy can 
mainly take the form of a grant, a tax reduction or of a soft loan
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 Soft loans are low rate or interest-free loans provided by financial institutions to favor the acquisition of item that help 
the transition towards sustainability. An example of such loans is providing households with loans aimed at purchasing 
or installing items recommended for their home to be sustainable.   
is a feed-in-tariff, which is aimed at favoring the uptake for alternative energy technologies. Such 
tariffs are mainly used for the uptake of solar energy technologies.  
Concrete examples of grants at stake range from the Flanders‘s Region grants to farmers to support 
sustainable and organic farming to Slovenia‘s subsidies for housing energy efficiency 
improvements for households. Tax reductions have been widely implemented as well, e.g. Italy‘s 
tax reduction of 0.03€ per kWh granted to users of biomass heating systems or Belgium‘s 
investment deduction for "green" R&D investments. 
The interplay between existing subsidies and environmental taxes or charges may also affect the 
overall environmental performance of a country. Taxes have indeed a key role in compensating for 
removing harmful subsidies, in  the phasing out phase of environmentally harmful subsidies, as 
―Environmental taxation and removing environmentally harmful subsidies can unlock the economy 
from the unsustainable path as these policies will ensure that the real costs of resource use and 
environmental pollution are paid by consumers and producers.‖ (EEA 2014: 71)  
The last instrument belonging to the category of market or incentive based systems are deposit 
refund systems. Those type of instruments usually act on products, such as plastic bottles, and work 
as a charge on the good for its disposal, which is compensated by a subsidy when it is returned to a 
collection point. Such a system is in place for the deposit and refund of plastic, glass and aluminum 
bottles in most of European countries e.g. Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Netherland, Poland and Slovenia. 
 
Command and control regulatory instruments 
 
Another category of hard instrument is the one labelled as ―Command and control‖. This is 
composed by non-market based instruments, as prices are no longer changed, rather standard or 
obligations are imposed or directly or in the form non-monetary incentives of command and 
control.  
Institutions could define a framework or performance standard or outcome to be met, or  technology 
to be used.  
Examples of concrete instruments of this field are specific performance standard on vehicle 
efficiency that limit the amount of emission per unit of output, or the imposition to operators to use 
specific abatement technologies. Further examples of this instrument are regulations that ban the 
use of specific products or that impose the use of certificates or registry over harmful substances. 
The California Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Programme launched in 1990, is an example of 
technology forcing command and control regulation, as it imposed 10% of sold automobiles to be 
ZEVs by 2003.   
To be considered is not only regulation‘s direct effect on countries adopting it but also on countries 
exporting to the adopters, who might be required to fit the standards that have been set, thus 
pushing the international diffusion of the standard. In diffusing the standard, this in turn promotes 
the development and diffusion of environmental technologies through two main channels. On the 
one hand exporting countries should modify their processes and products to fit the regulation. On 
the other hand, environmental regulation implemented in a country can push its exports towards 
external countries if these ground their policies based on the existing stricter market (EEA, 2014).  
One significant example of the capability of an internal regulation to influence on other countries‘ 
regulation is the European Chemical Regulation, REACh, as it affects all substances that are 
manufactured or marketed in the EU, i.e. all chemicals that are either exported or imported to the 
EU, thus affecting third countries as well. Countries outside EU, in order to trade within EU are 
indeed required to fit the standards set by the regulation and, more precisely, to register the 
chemical substances used. Moreover, regulation of chemicals in countries outside EU are aligning 
to fit REACh (EEA, 2014).   
When a standard on the use of a particular technology is set, it might however engender losses if it 
creates a technological lock-in or it prevent from the development of alternative and better 
technologies. The point is that technology forcing regulation refer to the best available technology 
available in the time the regulation is established, while standards should be dynamically further 
developed over time, in order not to force environmental innovations (EI henceforth) beyond the 
current technological frontier (Jänicke & Lindemann, 2010). Technology standards they tend to 
―freeze the development of technologies that might otherwise result in greater levels of control‖ as 
―no financial incentive exists for businesses to exceed control targets, and the adoption of new 
technologies is discouraged‖  (Jaffe et al., 2002; 50). 
For this reason, although they might have positive environmental effects, command-and-control 
regulations are considered as dynamically inefficient, as they do not provide enough long-term 
innovative incentives. The effort towards the standard indeed stops when the goal has been reached. 
Contrarily, the incentive in a market-based system seems to be stronger, as it does not disappear 
once the standard or the target has been met (Costantini et al, 2015). 
Voluntary agreements and information based instruments 
 
Softer typologies of instruments are those labelled as ―Voluntary agreements‖ and ―information 
based instruments‖. 
Voluntary agreements are at stake when institutions and firms or particular industrial sectors 
voluntarily coordinate for the adoption of pollution reduction strategies. The nature of such 
agreements is broad and sanctions might be set as well for non-complying actors. The agreement 
can either be on a specific target to be reached, e.g. the Flanders Region‘s Covenant on NOx and 
SO2 emissions from electricity producers' installations, or on the implementation of a specific 
programs aiming at improving environmental performance, e.g. the Czech Republic‘s Eco-
Labelling system negotiated with the Ministry of the Environment.  
The use of voluntary approaches is discussed as being appropriate when pollution emissions cannot 
be adequately monitored at the source, or when it is not clear and unambiguous which is the input 
or output of the production process that should be under market-based instruments. For instance, it 
might not be clear whether to set a tax on a specific input or output. 
It follows that the efficiency of these instruments in reducing externalities is considered insufficient, 
and their role is seen mostly as a complement for already existing policies ―when information about 
the environmental impact of products or available clean goods or activities is lacking and that it is 
not too costly for the government (or firms) to provide such information‖ (de Serres et al 2010:29).  
Information based instruments are instead means to improve consumer awareness on environmental 
impacts of goods on the market or on the available alternatives. Examples of these instruments are 
product certifications and labeling, such as eco-labels, which inform consumers on the 
environmental contents of the products in the market, or product‘s lifetime energy use or its 
greenhouse gases‘ emissions. Labelling and certifications may both be mandatory or voluntary in 
their nature.  
3. The optimal choice of environmental policies  
 
The choice of the set of instruments that have been previously described is not an easy task.  
Since the seminal contribution of Hahn (1984), there has been indeed specific attention to the 
intertwining between the effectiveness of market-based environmental policies and the degree of 
competition. Hahn‘s basic intuition is that markets for permits, like those typically established by 
cap-and-trade, are more effective when permits markets are competitive. Actually, when a dominant 
firm can be devised, it will exert its power to lower down the permits‘ price to minimize compliance 
costs, insofar as it holds a net buyer position. This topic has been further analyzed and extended by 
Hintermann (2011), who distinguishes between the position in permits‘ and product markets, and 
emphasizes the importance of the size of the free allocation. He shows that dominant firms in 
product markets, which take a net buyer position, will use their dominant position in permits‘ 
markets (if any) for strategic purposes, i.e. to raise rival costs. They will therefore exploit their 
power to push permits‘ prices upwards, to threat competitors by creating barriers to enter and 
survive in the industry. This framework proved to be useful in analyzing the price dynamics of EU 
ETS. Nesta et al. (2014) instead carry out an empirical analysis on OECD countries to show that 
also environmental policies based on subsidies perform better when conducted in competitive 
markets. These works actually motivate the joint implementation of environmental and competition 
policies. 
In a similar vein, Requate (2005) posits that under competitive conditions market based instruments 
usually perform better than command and control ones. An explanation to this is that environmental 
taxes and in general market based instruments provide longer term and more persistent incentives to 
innovate than others do and, moreover, flexible and thus more dynamic environmental policy 
instruments are seen as more effective than static ones (de Serres, et al 2011). In addition to this, the 
innovative effects of environmental policies are stronger when a long time horizon is set for the 
duration of the policy (Schmidt et al, 2012). 
Johnstone, Haščič, & Kalamova (2010) additionally propose to analyse environmental policies in 
terms of more specific characteristics of different instruments rather than on their market vs non-
market nature. In particular, they focus on the following characteristics of the policy instrument: 
stringency, predictability (or certainty), flexibility, incidence, and depth of the instruments. Here 
follows a description for these characteristics.  
• Stringency depends on how ambitious is the policy target, with respect to the baseline 
scenario; 
• Predictability depends on how much the policy signal is consistent, foreseeable, and 
credible; 
• Flexibility depends on the possibility given to the innovator to its best way to meet the 
objective set; 
• Incidence is related to the question: does the policy target the externality directly, or is the 
point of incidence a ‗proxy‘ for the pollutant? 
• Depth is related to the question are there incentives to innovate throughout the range of 
potential objectives? 
According to these criteria, the policy instrument is optimal when it is ―stringent enough to 
encourage that level of innovation which results in the optimal level of emissions; sufficiently stable 
to give investors the necessary planning horizon to undertake risky investments in innovation; 
sufficiently flexible to encourage innovators to identify innovative solutions which have not yet 
been identified; targeted as closely as possible on the policy objective in order to avoid 
misallocation of innovation efforts; and, provide continuous incentives to develop abatement 
technologies which could (in theory) drive down emissions to zero (Johnstone at al. 2010b: 7).  
So far, we outlined a set of suggestions that might help the policy maker in the choice of one 
instrument with respect to another, based either on the distinction between market or non-market 
based one or on the intrinsic nature of the instrument according to its stringency, predictability, 
flexibility, incidence, and depth. 
Evidence outlines that it is common for countries to deploy not just one instrument rather a 
combination of instruments in designing environmental policies. This habit is usually labeled 
‗policy packages‘ or ‗instrument mixes‘ or policy mixes. As all the listed typologies of 
environmental instruments can stimulate environmental innovations, there is a tendency to combine 
them all in a mixed policy, which is in principle able to correct for the predominant market failures 
and institutional capacities of respective countries (De Serres et al 2010; 2011).  
However, this may lead to contrasting effects of policy on environmental objectives (Costantini and 
Crespi, 2008 and 2013; Böhringer et al., 2009;  Serres et al. 2010; Borghesi et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that the proliferation of policy instruments has not 
even stopped the rise in CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere (Huppes, 2011). This lead some 
scholars to argue that more powerful systems need to be developed. A proposal in this direction is 
the establishment of a global carbon deposit system (Huppes, 2011), based on pricing carbon 
emissions from any source and any country. Wood and Jotzo‘s (2011) contribution goes in the 
direction of empirically testing the economic-environmental effects of a combination of an 
environmental tax to be added to the emission permit price. This is seen as a viable option, as the 
tax is in principle added to permits‘ price- but under certain conditions.  
The selection of the most appropriate policy instrument to address a specific environmental 
problems, involves not only the choice of the available instruments and the design to make them 
effective, but also the issue as to how to combine this choice with already existing regulations.  
4. Innovation policies and the environment  
 
 
So far, the incentive to generate and adopt innovations that improve environmental performances 
has been mainly provided by environmental policies, which are seen more and more as key to enact 
inducement mechanisms. However, though environmental policies may well represent a stimulus 
for new research activities, innovation systems should be equipped with adequate scientific and 
technological knowledge in order for the economy to creatively respond to changes in policy 
constraints (Costantini and Crespi, 2008).  
Since the seminal contributions by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), a wide body of literature has 
acknowledged the basic fact that markets are likely to fail in the identification of the correct amount 
of resources to be allocated to research activities.  
One solution is an Intellectual Property Rights IPR policy that enforces the functioning of the 
existing IPR system or, in its absence, creates a new one. This is in line with the Lindhal‘s approach 
for public policies when dealing with a problem of under-investment in innovative activities when 
the private benefits of such activities are lower than their social benefits. The solution proposed is 
that of making knowledge a ―commodity‖, whose benefits are fully appropriable to the firm, by 
creating a (temporary) monopoly over the invention. This solution calls for the development of an 
IPR system able to protect inventions through formal protection mechanisms such as patent or 
trademarks.  
In addition, governments have devoted significant shares of public budgets to fund not only 
programs aiming at fostering the generation of new scientific knowledge within research oriented 
institutions, but also innovative activities carried out by private firms (OECD, 2007). Despite this, 
the real effect of R&D subsidies on firm‘s innovative activities is not clear-cut, as it is possible that 
public subsidies crowd-out private investment (David and Hall, 2000; David et al., 2000; Hall and 
van Reenen, 2000; Bloom et al., 2002).  
Different motivations have been provided for potential drawbacks of public R&D incentives. The 
first issue concerns asymmetric information and the consequent difficulty for policymakers and 
program officials to know which firms deserve to be funded (Grossman, 1991; Stiglitz and 
Wallsten, 2000). Other strands of literature emphasize that the opportunities relate to public support 
provides industries and other interest groups with an incentive to invest large resources in 
unproductive rent-seeking activities such as lobbying (see e.g. Tollison, 1997). Moreover, 
bureaucrats may further jeopardize the efficiency of R&D public support by maximizing their own 
private utility rather than the social welfare (Link, 1977).  
The allocation procedures of public subsidies do matter in this context. Two main mechanisms can 
be devised as far as the allocation of public subsidies to R&D activities is concerned: i) automatic 
procedures typically associated with tax expenditures; ii) discretionary procedures based upon the 
quality assessment of research projects. The main difference between tax credits and direct grants is 
that the former represents a general measure that may apply to all industries and firms 
independently from their specific characteristics.  Hence, the most important benefit of tax credit 
programs as compared to direct grants is that they minimize the discretionary power that public 
agents hold when allocating public resources.  
Much literature has however criticized automatic procedures, mainly based upon tax reductions, and 
stressed the advantages of discretionary procedures based upon the actual screening of research 
projects and of direct funding of public research programs (Mazzucato, 2013). Tax credits may 
imply to provide support to an array of activities that often can hardly be classified as R&D, which 
are likely to be performed by firms that are not actually able to properly carry out research projects 
and to make an effective use of the subsidies. In this respect, the risks of opportunistic behavior 
seem to be very relevant. Firms often classify some expenses in their balance sheets as R&D, while 
they actually concern other kinds of business activities barely related to research. In parallel, firms‘ 
lobbying activities exert relevant pressure on government authorities in order to adjust the 
definitions of what is actually meant by ―R&D‖ so as to broadening the range of allowable costs 
(Alt et al., 2010). Moreover, according to David et al. (2000), private firms are likely to use tax 
credits prioritizing  projects with the highest private rates of return, focusing their research efforts 
on projects with short term prospects. These projects are not necessarily the ones deserving public 
support, which should in turn be targeted to projects with the largest gap between social and private 
returns. Hence, even though tax credits represent a straightforward mechanism to providing public 
support to R&D, and to minimize problems related to discretionary decisions from public actors, 
they do not seem to be the most efficient tool to spur innovation activities (Mazzucato, 2013).  
Discretionary procedures based upon quality assessment of research projects to allocate R&D 
grants, are potentially better suited to enhance innovation investments, as they are more likely to 
support better research projects, and provide a framework helping identifying and supporting 
potential complementarities among innovative projects (Mohnen and Roller, 2005). As a matter of 
fact many countries do rely on discretionary selection procedures, and the empirical literature 
showed that despite the potential drawbacks associated with them, selective public subsidies, in 
general, do have a positive effect on R&D investments (Antonelli and Crespi, 2013).  
Lastly, what is called a ―lead market approach‖ for EI needs a discussion in this framework. A lead 
market policy can be defined as a demand-side intervention aimed at promoting environmental 
technologies that can engender first mover advantages for national firms and favor the early-
adoption of EI and thus their invention and diffusion. It is characterized by the existence of price, 
demand, transfer, export and market structure advantages that benefit firms operating in such 
markets (Beise and Rennings, 2005). Innovation developed in a lead market conditions are more 
likely to become a dominant design and to be then globally adopted as they have been developed 
and protected in a market niche and they are then able to spread to other countries when the 
environmental technology is established (Quitzow et al. 2014).  
The more recent innovation systems approach has further extended the range of legitimate 
justification and scope for public intervention in this field (Metcalfe, 1995; Georghiou and 
Metcalfe, 1998; Edquist, 2001). In particular, a growing body of economic literature suggested that 
traditional economic approaches are inappropriate for dealing with the dynamics of structural and 
adaptive changes in economic systems (Rammel and van der Bergh, 2003). The relevant lesson 
emerging from the systemic approach suggests that innovation is a complex evolutionary process 
distributed in a system of different agents whose behaviour and interactions are governed both by 
market forces and by non-market institutions (Metcalfe, 1995; Crespi and Quatraro, 2013 and 
2015). 
Agents‘ interactions and the institutions governing them determine the innovative performance of 
the system. The systemic framework opens up a new perspective for policy making in general and, 
more specifically, for the design of an appropriate policy structure to foster the dynamics of eco-
innovations. This approach highlights the interactions and interdependencies between different 
policies, and shows how such interactions affect the extent to which policy goals are realized.  
In this context the choice of instruments and the analysis of their interactions represent crucial 
decisions for the formulation of policy design (Flanagan et al., 2011).  
 
4. Conclusions: towards an integrated innovation-oriented environmental policy 
 
Moving from a description of existing environmental and innovation policies, summarized into 
Table 1, we now discuss how to shape an integrated innovation oriented environmental policy that 
stimulates the evolution of environmental innovations.  
Table 1: Environmental and innovation policy instruments 
Policy domain Instrument type Example 
Environmental 
Policy 
H
A
R
D
 I
N
S
T
R
U
M
E
N
T
S
 
Market based 
instruments 
 Emissions trading schemes 
o Incentives: EU ETS 
o Credits:  CDM  
 environmental taxes and charges: 
o on pollution: carbon tax or in general tax on 
emissions 
o on inputs: tax on fuels, tax on water consumption, 
tax on pesticides 
o on ouputs: tax on air tickets   
 deposit-refund systems: 
o charge on disposal of a good (e.g. plastic, glass and 
aluminum bottles) to be compensated when returned 
to the collection point 
 subsidies and compensation mechanisms 
o grant 
o tax reduction  
o soft loan 
 green purchasing 
Command and 
control 
instruments 
Institutions could define: 
 Standards e.g. on vehicle efficiency  
 Obligations e.g. on the registration of chemical substances in 
REACh 
 Technology to be used e.g. imposing the use of the best 
available technology 
S
O
F
T
 I
N
S
T
R
U
M
E
N
T
S
 
Voluntary 
agreements 
Institutions and firms may agree on reducing pollution through: 
 A specific target on emission/pollution reduction 
 An implementation of a program 
 A possible charge for non-complying agents 
Information 
based 
instruments 
Improving consumers / suppliers / customers awareness through: 
 Product certifications 
 Labels  
 
 
Innovation 
policy 
IPR Enforcing / Creating a functioning Intellectual Property Right 
protection mechanisms 
Tax credits Allocating tax credits for innovative firms 
R&D subsidies Subsidising R&D activities 
Systemic instruments  Public R&D labs 
 Technology Transfer instruments 
 Technology platforms 
 
As EI are ―special‖ innovations affected by a ―double externality‖ (Rennings, 2000), the need for 
innovation policies to be specifically directed towards the development of EI emerges, as traditional 
innovation policies might not be enough to spur their development and adoption, given their 
peculiarities. Empirical analysis on the determinants of EI (e.g. Horbach et al., 2012; Rennings and 
Rexhauser, 2011) stress the central role of policy in inducing EI, and empirical analysis have 
confirmed regulation‘s pivotal role (Veugelers, 2012). This is something that has to be taken into 
account when eco-innovation policies are implemented. Moreover, not only the existence of 
innovation oriented environmental policy matters in stimulating EI, but also its stringency. In other 
words, it is the stringency of a regulation to affect the rate and direction of green technological 
change (Johnstone et al. 2010a; 2010b; 2012). 
Some prescription on how innovation oriented environmental policies should look like have 
emerged from previous contributions. Del Rio and coauthors (2010) suggest some characteristics 
that policy instruments should have, which they label general features, or ―framework conditions‖. 
For instance policy aimed at overcoming barriers to EI, for which a suggestion of simultaneously 
use and better integration of environmental and technology policies and of searching for a balancing 
between short-term protection and longer-term promotion of radical EI in order to avoid 
technological lock-ins is suggested. Lock-in in suboptimal technologies might be indeed a negative 
side effect of a policy, and this will favor the uptake of ‗incremental‘ innovations, based on 
improvement of already existing technologies, rather than radical and systemic, e.g. the 
development of new technologies or products or services.  
Furthermore, the complexity of EI suggests the need of policy instruments to fit each different 
phase of the process, from invention to diffusion, as effective policies should differ along the 
process (Jänicke & Lindemann, 2010). Innovation policies to support R&D might favor the 
invention phase, a command-and-control policy setting a technology standard can influence both 
the invention and the innovation phase as well as the dynamics of innovation diffusion. Information 
mechanisms such as eco-label can result to be central in the diffusion process of EI.  
More precisely, market based instruments can influence the whole innovation cycle, as they alter 
the direction and rate of technological change. In this respect, a lead market policy can favor the 
early diffusion of EI and thus promote innovative investment. Some further prescription on how an 
innovation oriented environmental policy should be is that the ecological effect of EI should be the 
priority of the innovation. In other words ―Environmental policy should not just promote any kind 
of environmental innovation but seek to maximize the ecological effectiveness of technology 
development‖ (Jänicke & Lindemann, 2010:129). The authors differentiate between weak EI, e.g. 
incremental or radical innovation with low market penetration rates, and strong EI, e.g. incremental 
or radical EI that have high market penetration rates and thus an high environmental impact. All in 
all, greater environmental improvements are associated with radical EI with high penetration rates 
as ―it is the replacement of coal-fired power plants by renewable energies rather than continuous 
incremental efficiency gains that will ensure the decoupling of environmental pressures from 
economic growth and the absolute reduction of environmental impacts‖ (Jänicke & Lindemann, 
2010:130). Coherently, policies should be focused on the uptake of strong EI, and in particular on 
radical ones, to maximize the environmental benefits.  
To sum up, when the policy goal is to spur the uptake of EI, the adoption of a combination of 
instruments, policy mix, is not seen as a problem , but rather as a value added when environmental 
and innovation or technology-specific policies are combined. Such combination of policies can be 
facilitated by the development of governmental transition management schemes, in which the 
government facilitates and plans the transition to a greener economy by combining available 
instruments.  
When this mix is optimal and covers the entire innovation life-cycle, literature uses the term ―smart 
regulation‖ (Ekins and Venn 2006). The explanation to this (apparent) contradiction lies in the 
complementarity between environmental and innovation regulation. The first is designed to reduce 
negative, environmental externalities, while the second addresses positive externalities, mainly 
knowledge-related externalities, deriving from problem of appropriability of the benefits from 
innovation investments.  
Neglecting the need to combine environmental and innovation policies can lead to ―unintended and 
very undesirable outcomes‖ such as the ―rebound effect‖ or technological lock-in (Biswanger, 
2001; van den Bergh, 2013: 18). In the presence of a technology policy e.g. renewable energy 
subsidy and in the absence of an environmental regulation e.g. a carbon tax, the subsidy can 
increase the supply of electricity, reducing the prices for fuels, thus increasing their extraction, and 
increasing GHG emissions. In parallel, in the presence of environmental regulation without 
appropriate innovation policies, it can be more likely to observe technological lock-in as ―Selection 
pressure will then favor currently cost-effective technologies which may lead to an early lock-in of 
these at the disadvantage of technological alternatives that are more desirable from a long-run 
perspective‖ (van den Bergh, 2013: 18). The presence of initial economic advantages for already 
existing technological trajectories built around dirty technologies can create lock-ins that, in the 
absence of a proper policy, may hamper the uptake of EI. In addition, the presence of inadequate 
policies can create such lock-ins. The case of internal combustion engines, described in Oltra and 
Saint Jean (2009) is an example of a dominant design of a dirty technology that has been 
continuously made more efficient through incremental innovations. This improved its 
environmental efficiency, but also led to technological inertia that prevented the development of 
radical innovations as alternative engine technologies e.g. electric or fuel cells vehicles. All in all, if 
adopting evolutionary lens some type of incremental innovations can even be detrimental when it 
reinforces existing inefficient (and possible more polluting) trajectories (Cecere et al., 2014).  
In this respect, innovation policies designed to favor technological exploration activities and 
improve knowledge variety might be crucial in escaping technological lock-ins and fostering the 
evolution of green technologies. The implementation of sound and specific technology-push 
policies and increasing coordination between environmental and innovation policies certainly 
represent challenges to be addressed to increase the effectiveness of both. 
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Appendix 
 
This Appendix provides empirical evidence on the inducement effects played by policies to support the 
discussion on the role of policies for environmental innovations outlined in the paper. It is worth noting that 
the estimated relations can only be considered as informative of the presence of conditional correlation 
between regulation and eco-innovation, and that only weak claims of causality can be done. 
A country-sector level analysis based on Eurostat and OECD data sources is proposed, coherently with 
previous contributions that motivate the appropriateness of such a focus (e.g. Gilli et al. 2013). The aim of 
the appendix is to empirically test for the role of policies, measured in several alternative ways, in inducing 
the adoption of EI by firms.  
The core data on environmental innovations adoption are taken from the Eurostat Community Innovation 
Survey for the year 2006-2008. As this survey introduced for the first time a section on EI adoption, the 
analysis is conducted on those countries that included such section in the survey and that made results 
available for consultation. Those are the following: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. As for the sectors included in the analysis, we 
focused on the following aggregates: 
Table A1: Sectors included in the analysis 
NACE Rev. 2 Code Sectors’ definition 
  
C10-C12 Manufacture of food products 
Manufacture of beverages 
Manufacture of tobacco products 
C13-C15 Manufacture of textiles 
Manufacture of wearing apparel 
Manufacture of leather and related products 
C16-C18 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
C19-C22 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
Preparations 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
C24-C25 Manufacture of basic metals 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
C26-C30 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
C31-C33 Manufacture of furniture 
Other manufacturing 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
 
The baseline model we estimate is the one reported into Equation A1.   
  (             )                                               (A1) 
                                                    
Nine typologies of environmental innovations adopted constitute our dependent variables (EI). Previous 
literature highlighted the need to open the box of EI and to look into the heterogeneities that each typology of 
EI brings about (e.g. Ghisetti and Rennings, 2014). For this reason we estimate Equation A1 on nine 
different dependent variables, each of which represents the share of firms of the country-sector adopting a 
specific type of EI: reducing carbon dioxide emissions (EOCO2), energy use per unit of output (ECOEN) or 
after sales use (ECOENU), material use (ECOMAT), soil, water, noise, or air pollution per output 
(ECOPOL) or after sales use (ECOPOS),  improving recycling per output (ECOREC) or after sales use 
(ECOREA) and replacing materials with less polluting or hazardous substitutes (ECOREC). Estimations are 
carried out though Ordinary Least Squares estimator with robust standard errors to cope with 
heteroscedasticity problems. As EI adoption has been surveyed in the CIS 2006-2008, we are only able to 
run a cross-sectional analysis in which dependent and explanatory variables refer either to the period 2006-
2008 (EI variables, RD, REG, FUT_REG, GRANTS) or to 2008 (POL_index, lCo2_va).  
As for the explanatory variables, we drew on already established literature to derive a set of core control 
variables to be included (e.g. Ghisetti et al. 2015; Horbach et al 2012). Given the low number of 
observations, we had not enough degrees of freedom to include additional variables. In particular, we chose 
to control for the role of external R&D activities (RD) and country dummies to capture structural country 
heterogeneities and we included our core policy variable, which has been constructed in alternative ways. As 
policy does incorporate an induction effect on internal R&D, we have opted to include the external R&D 
variable to avoid potential biases. Whereas our sample equals 134 observations in the case of a policy 
variable constructed from CIS data, it falls to 68 and 71 when exploiting alternative policy measures, as data 
are not available for all the countries of the first dataset, more precisely Eastern EU countries are excluded. 
Table A2 reports the variables short description together with their descriptive statistics, while Table A3 
outlines the pairwise correlations among them. 
Table A2: Variables descriptive statistics 
Variables Description N mean Sd min max 
ECOCO2  Share of firms adopting EI aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
134 0.217 0.0993 0.0238 0.491 
ECOEN 
 Share of firms adopting EI aimed at reducing energy use per unit of 
output 
134 0.337 0.131 0.0319 0.620 
ECOENU  Share of firms adopting EI aimed at reducing energy use after sales use 
134 0.272 0.115 0.0347 0.519 
ECOMAT 
 Share of firms adopting EI aimed at reducing material use per unit of 
output 
134 0.331 0.122 0 0.641 
ECOPOL 
 Share of firms adopting EI aimed at reducing  soil, water, noise, or air 
pollution 
134 0.303 0.129 0 0.629 
ECOPOS 
 Share of firms adopting EI aimed at reducing air, water, soil or noise 
pollution after sales use 
134 0.241 0.115 0 0.541 
ECOREA 
 Share of firms adopting EI aimed at improving recycling of product 
after use 
134 0.234 0.119 0 0.493 
ECOREC  Share of firms adopting EI aimed at recycling waste, water, or materials 
134 0.346 0.168 0 0.752 
ECOSUB 
 Share of firms adopting EI aimed at replacing materials with less 
polluting or hazardous substitutes 
134 0.292 0.126 0 0.765 
FUT_REG Motivation of incoming regulation as a driver of the innovation adopted 
134 0.212 0.108 0 0.575 
GRANTS 
Motivation of availability of  grants or subsidies as a driver of the 
innovation adopted 
134 0.0742 0.0483 0 0.266 
REG 
Motivation of existing regulation or taxes on pollution as a driver of the 
innovation adopted 
134 0.284 0.142 0 0.708 
POL index 
Policy index constructed as the sum of existing environmental policies 
as in the OECD Environmental Policy Indicators dataset 
71 0.608 0.591 0 2.333 
RD Share of firms exploiting external R&D activities 
134 0.225 0.127 0 0.657 
co2_va Ratio between carbon dioxide emissions and value added 
68 0.757 2.169 0.0116 15.82 
All variables are built at a sector-country level of analysis 
Table A3: Variables pairwise correlation matrix  
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 ECOCO2 1                     
2 ECOEN 0.7146* 1              
3 ECOENU 0.6407* 0.7356* 1             
4 ECOMAT 0.6225* 0.7611* 0.6511* 1            
5 ECOPOL 0.6410* 0.7333* 0.6624* 0.6518* 1           
6 ECOPOS 0.4972* 0.5972* 0.7785* 0.5867* 0.8287* 1          
7 ECOREA 0.5826* 0.6184* 0.7526* 0.6126* 0.7602* 0.7966* 1         
8 ECOREC 0.6294* 0.6426* 0.6501* 0.6136* 0.7714* 0.6887* 0.8698* 1        
9 ECOSUB 0.5100* 0.5329* 0.4683* 0.6571* 0.6614* 0.5188* 0.5878* 0.5772* 1       
10 FUT REG 0.2592* 0.5126* 0.3617* 0.5515* 0.4351* 0.4222* 0.4167* 0.3172* 0.4669* 1      
11 GRANTS 0.3404* 0.3116* 0.3933* 0.3803* 0.4076* 0.4653* 0.4921* 0.3812* 0.2955* 0.4475* 1     
12 REG 0.1836* 0.4566* 0.3463* 0.4575* 0.4336* 0.4421* 0.4140* 0.3256* 0.4086* 0.8712* 0.4204* 1    
13 RD 0.2061* 0.2653* 0.2729* 0.2964* 0.2294* 0.170 0.2661* 0.3504* 0.3043* 0.1744* 0.0948 -0.0236 1   
14 co2 va 0.163 0.228 0.211 0.215 0.249 0.2689* 0.238 0.210 0.153 0.3381* 0.00450 0.168 -0.0258 1  
15 POL index 0.129 0.0480 0.00470 -0.0347 0.186 0.0782 0.0232 0.0463 0.0781 0.2904* 0.242 0.216 0.0154 0.2840* 1 
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At first, we built a policy variable able to capture a broad measure of environmental regulatory stringency. 
Drawing on previous literature (Costantini and Crespi, 2008) it has been built as the logarithm of the ratio 
between carbon dioxide emissions and value added (lCO2_va). The results of this first model are reported in 
table A4 and support is found for the inducement effect played by environmental regulation stringency on 
the share of adoption of EI, though with some exceptions in which regulatory stringency does not display 
any significant effect.  
Table A4: Results on environmental policy built as an environmental policy stringency variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 ECOCO2 ECOEN ECOENU ECOMAT ECOPOL ECOPOS ECOREA ECOREC ECOSUB 
RD 0.1757 0.3655*** 0.5001*** 0.3613*** 0.1046 0.3350*** 0.2688*** 0.2210** 0.3388*** 
 (0.1110) (0.1191) (0.1119) (0.1166) (0.0962) (0.1048) (0.0993) (0.0990) (0.1104) 
          
lco2_va 0.0092 0.0165*** -0.0021 0.0089* 0.0219*** 0.0084* 0.0050 0.0180*** 0.0013 
 (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0049) 
          
Constant 0.3257*** 0.3334*** 0.2801*** 0.3057*** 0.3365*** 0.2154*** 0.3606*** 0.5800*** 0.3306*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0480) (0.0408) (0.0473) (0.0285) (0.0526) (0.0278) (0.0431) (0.0390) 
N 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
R2 0.6640 0.7180 0.6707 0.6621 0.7106 0.6703 0.7701 0.8441 0.6332 
Country 
D 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
As an alternative to this broad measure of policy intervention, we conducted further estimations in which the 
policy variable has been replaced with alternative measures.  
In the second round of estimations, the policy-related variable has been extracted from the CIS 2006-2008 
survey. It refers to the motivations that drove firms to adopt EI. In particular, we selected among the 
available options the adoption of EI consequently to existing regulations or taxes on pollution (REG), to 
expected forthcoming regulations (FUT_REG) or to the availability of subsidies and grants (GRANTS). In 
the second model, we thus jointly included REG, FUT_REG and GRANTS to test for the role of these 
motivations in driving the rate of EI‘s adoption. As it emerges from Table A4 GRANTS do actually drive 
EI‘s adoption choices in the case of ECOMAT, ECOPOL, ECOPOS and ECOREC, while the expectations 
over an upcoming environmental regulation, is a significant driver of EI in most of the cases, with the only 
exceptions of ECOENU, ECOPOL and ECOREC. Surprisingly instead the role of existing regulation and 
taxes of pollution is found to play only a rather marginal role, as it determines EI only in the case of 
recycling related innovations (ECOREA and ECOREC). 
Table A5: Results on environmental policy built from CIS data  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 ECOCO2 ECOEN ECOENU ECOMAT ECOPOL ECOPOS ECOREA ECOREC ECOSUB 
RD -0.0060 0.1448 0.2111** 0.0933 0.0308 0.1451* 0.0365 0.1041 0.1675 
 (0.0648) (0.0901) (0.0923) (0.1077) (0.0779) (0.0775) (0.0754) (0.0871) (0.1265) 
          
REG 0.1444 0.0655 -0.0593 -0.1211 -0.0897 -0.1687 0.2557* 0.3191** 0.0430 
 (0.1221) (0.1399) (0.1426) (0.1618) (0.2842) (0.1898) (0.1362) (0.1457) (0.2860) 
          
FUT_REG 0.3146** 0.3456* 0.2757 0.5621*** 0.3148 0.3628** 0.2629** 0.1467 0.5672** 
 (0.1472) (0.1789) (0.1664) (0.1939) (0.2353) (0.1652) (0.1287) (0.1884) (0.2546) 
          
GRANTS -0.0301 0.2980 0.2890 0.5415** 0.8452** 0.7365*** 0.3255 0.5352** 0.2187 
 (0.1766) (0.1845) (0.2004) (0.2173) (0.3300) (0.2737) (0.2427) (0.2056) (0.4402) 
          
Constant 0.1747 0.1581 0.1865 0.1126 -0.0211 0.0625 0.0161 -0.0333 -0.0313 
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 (0.1261) (0.1395) (0.1170) (0.0905) (0.0244) (0.0516) (0.0204) (0.0309) (0.0316) 
N 134 134 134 134 134 134 133 134 134 
R2 0.7703 0.7905 0.7360 0.7325 0.7456 0.7438 0.8630 0.8744 0.6109 
Country D yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
Table A6: Results on composite policy index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 ECOCO2 ECOEN ECOENU ECOMAT ECOPOL ECOPOS ECOREA ECOREC ECOSUB 
RD 0.0806 0.2622** 0.4151*** 0.3051** 0.1617 0.3598*** 0.3083*** 0.2766*** 0.4244*** 
 (0.0972) (0.1035) (0.1180) (0.1199) (0.1025) (0.1072) (0.0858) (0.1002) (0.1381) 
          
POL_index 0.0280* 0.0369*** 0.0169 0.0325** 0.0702*** 0.0302** 0.0104 0.0500*** 0.0281* 
 (0.0146) (0.0136) (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0149) 
          
Constant 0.3204*** 0.2474*** 0.1011** 0.2860*** 0.3175*** 0.1618** 0.2057*** 0.4861*** 0.2048 
 (0.0528) (0.0389) (0.0491) (0.0811) (0.0782) (0.0641) (0.0538) (0.0514) (0.1276) 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
R2 0.6616 0.7010 0.6461 0.6489 0.7082 0.6421 0.7515 0.8399 0.5615 
Country D yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
We then exploited the OECD database on instruments used for environmental policy and natural resources 
management that collects information on environmentally related taxes, fees and charges, tradable permit 
systems, deposit refund systems, environmentally motivated subsidies and voluntary approaches used in 
environmental policy. In the third round of estimations, we built the policy variable as an index that counts 
the number of instruments in place for each country-sector (POL_index) among environmentally related 
taxes, fees and charges, tradable permit systems, voluntary approaches, deposit refund schemes and 
subsidies. This variable emerges to be as expected a significant driver for most the typologies of EI, with the 
only exception of ECOENU and ECOREA.  
Overall, we can conclude that, coherently with the literature scrutinized in the paper, policies are found to 
play a crucial role in supporting or even spurring the adoption of environmental innovations. We then 
differentiated among i) typologies of policy instruments and ii) typologies of innovations. We found support 
that actually the inducement effects depend on the type of instrument under scrutiny: this is coherent with the 
qualitative overview of available policy instruments provided in the paper. We also found empirical support 
to the argument linking inducement effects of a policy and the specific type of EI one may be willing to spur, 
as heterogeneous EI differently react to the array of policy instruments scrutinized. Given the cross-sectoral 
nature of the available dataset and the consequently limited empirical setting, it is needed to acknowledge as 
the main limitation of this exercise the fact that we can interpret the relation between EI and policy as a 
(significant) correlation, rather than as a proper causality effect of policy on EI.  
 
